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THE INHERENT CONSERVATISM
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
By EDGAR BODENHEIMER*
The legal profession, not only of this country, but of
other countries as well, has often been criticized for being
behind the times, for opposing progress and change, and
for clinging to the legal traditions of ages long past. It is
the purpose of this article to ascertain whether this criticism has some basis in fact and, if so, to examine the reasons underlying a conservative attitude on the part of the
legal profession. Throughout this discussion, the term "legal
profession" is used to denote the men called upon to decide
with authoritative force disputes and controversies arising
in society (i.e., the Bench), and the men engaged in assisting, counseling, and representing persons involved in such
controversies or in other matters of a legal nature (i.e., the
Bar).
I.
When we study Roman as well as Anglo-American legal
history, we find it to be true as a general proposition that
the most far-reaching changes and fundamental innovations
in the structure and fabric of the law were brought about,
not by the actions of the legal profession, but by the efforts
and acts of men or groups of men outside its ranks. Several.
of the great codes of law, like those of Hammurabi, Justinian, Frederick the Great of Prussia, and Napoleon, were
promulgated by absolute rulers, some of whom took an active
and leading part in the execution of the legislative project.
Sometimes, as in the case of France, a political and economic revolution was necessary to break the ground for a
fundamental revision and codification of the law. Celebrated statutes, like the XII Tables in Rome and Solon's
legislation in Greece, owed their origin to violent struggles
between economic classes, resulting in the enactment of the
legislation as an expedient of political compromise. The
Magna Carta, which had such a far-reaching influence on
J.D., 1932, Heidelberg; LL.B., 1937, B.A., 1940, University of
Washington. Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah.
Author of "Jurisprudence" (1940).
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the course of English constitutional and legal history, was
the outcome of political strife between the English king
and the fuedal barons. The enactment of constitutions,
embodying the fundamental principles of the legal order,
was generally the result of a new alignment of political
forces, causing basic changes in governmental structure, or
was brought about by the willingness of rulers to make
certain concessions to their people. Military conquest or
occupation by a foreign power have also been the occasion
for fundamental modifications of the constitutional and
legal system of a country, as recent events in Europe amply
demonstrate.
In all of these cases, the torch of law reform and basic
innovation was carried by men or groups wielding political
power rather than by professional men learned in the law.
The contributions of the legal profession in promoting and
accomplishing momentous changes in the law have been
relatively small. They were at best of an auxiliary nature,
consisting in the preparation and drafting of constitutions
and other legislation. It is, of course, true that political
leaders instrumental in law reform have sprung from the
legal profession, and lawyers have frequently been members
of legislatures or law-making councils. Since, however, a
formal professional training in the law has hardly ever
been made a prerequisite for the exercise of law-making
functions, the previous connection of such men with the legal
profession was a more or less accidental factor. By and
large, it can be said that judges and lawyers, as such and
in their capacity as professional men, have rarely been the
primary architects of basic legal change.
It might be objected that the path of English and
American law is strewn with the decisions of great judges
opening up new legal vistas resulting in significant developments in the law. Lord Mansfield's decision in Moses v.
Macferlan,i giving birth to the modern law of quasi-contracts,
and Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison,2
pronouncing the doctrine of judicial review of legislation,
might be cited to support such a thesis.
It is very questionable, however, whether either of
these decisions (and others of similar fame) should be
1. 2 Burr. 1005 (1760).
2. 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).

1948]

THE INHERENT CONSERVATISM

deemed to constitute a sharp break with the past, in the
same sense in which many of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code, or of Solon's legislation, or of some of the modern English and American statutes in the field of social
legislation, must be considered as decisive departures from
past legal tradition. As is pointed out by Holdsworth, the
decision in Moses v. Maeferlan merely gave precision and
form to a previously existing incoherent set of rules stated
in a number of heterogeneous cases.3 And furthermore,
Lord Mansfield, in his own opinion, merely purported to
give express and articulate sanction to a remedy which
already the Roman Law had recognized and which he considered to be grounded on the postulates of "natural justice" and equity. As to Marbury v. Madison, it is arguable
that the pronouncement of the principle of judicial review
of legislation was not, as some have contended, an arbitrary
usurpation of power by the judiciary, but a necessary corollary of a political and legal system governed by the idea
of the supremacy of constitutional law over ordinary legislation; and many of the men intimately associated with
the initial organization of American government and the
drafting of the Constitution considered the doctrine as an
4
inherent part of American governmental theory.
It is believed that in both of these decisions, although
they have at times been labelled "revolutionary," the eyes
of the deciding judges were not entirely directed forward,
to the future, but were also fixed on the past, in an attempt
to build on that which earlier generations had done, or to
determine that which was reasonable and necessary to give
full effect to an existing system of government. In fact,
it will be a rare and exceptional occurrence to find a judicial decision to which the attribute of "revolutionary" is
truly applicable. On the whole, the evolution of law through
the actions of the judiciary has been of an extremely gradual character and has been achieved by adding or subtracting a little here and a little there; by granting an old
remedy in a new situation; by devising a novel remedy for
a situation so similar to an adjudicated situation that elementary postulates of justice demanded an extension of
3. Holdsworth, "A History of English Law" Vol. VIII, 97 (1925).
4. Cf. Potter, "Judicial Power in the United States" 27 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 167, 285 (1928).
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judicial relief; or by cutting down step by step the application of a principle deemed antiquated to an increasingly
smaller number of fact situations, until the time seemed
ripe for an abandonment of the principle itself. The practice of the courts has continually changed, but with rare
exceptions each change was so slight that it was hardly
perceptible until a series of changes had brought about the
emergence of a new principle or of a new practice. In other
words, the judiciary has kept the law abreast of the changing times by cautious patchwork, by closing some gaps,
by repairing small leaks, and by filling some cavities in
decayed parts of the legal structure. It has not considered
it its function to tear down substantial parts of the structure and to replace them with new ones.
These considerations apply to the English and American
judges as well as to their Roman counterpart, the praetor.
While the praetor, like the Anglo-American judge in a jury
trial, did not participate in the determination, of the issue
of fact in a litigation, the decision as to whether an action
should be granted to the plaintiff or a certain defense be
allowed to the defendant was entrusted to him. And in
awarding remedies and recognizing defenses, the praetor
enjoyed a large amount of power and discretion. 5 However,
the most decisive changes in the body of the Roman Law
in the course of its history did not stem from the actions
of the praetors. The improvements and innovations which
he introduced in the judicial system were slight and gradual,
and no praetor claimed the power to abrogate a statute or
a basic rule of the civil law, just as no common law judge
would say-in the words of Justice Holmes-that "the doctrine of consideration is a bit of historical nonsense and I
shall not enforce it in my court."" The most far-reaching
modifications in the structure and fabric of the Roman
Law, especially in the field of social legislation, were brought
about by the action of popular assemblies, resolutions passed
by the Senate or, in the period of the late Empire, by decrees of all-powerful Emperors. Here again we observe the
phenomenon that, even though the professional officials
charged with administering the judicial system had been
5. See Bryce, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence" 693-694 (1901).
6. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
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endowed with large powers, fundamental legal change came,
not from inside, but from outside the legal profession.
There was once a judge in France, M. Magnaud, who
as president of the judicial tribunal at Chateau-Thierry
considered the judicial function in a sense much different
from the traditional approach of the Anglo-American judge
or the Roman praetor. He believed his function to be that
of a social innovator who would bend the law in all cases
to suit the needs of the economically weaker party in litigation coming before his court. His sympathies were with
the poor and the working people, and in his judicial decisions
he set out on a course designed above all to protect their
interests. In doing so, he did not feel bound by the traditional legal doctrine and by the established practice of other
courts. He scorned "legal law" and would be guided solely
by his own preconceived notions of social justice, a policy
of cases led to a deliberate disregard
which in a number
7
of statutory law.
The experiment of Judge Magnaud found few defenders
and evoked the criticism even of those legal scholars who
were willing to allow a comprehensive scope to the creative
activities of the judges." His approach is generally rejected
for the same reasons which prompt us to deny judges the
right to establish minimum wages or enact health insurance
schemes in the absence of statutory regulation-such experiments not being within the legitimate area of judicial
action.
Turning from the Bench to the Bar, the observation
that the legal profession is a group of men strongly tied
to the past rather than a group of pioneers blazing new
trails into the future applies with even greater force. It
would be very far from the mark to assert that the famous
Roman jurisconsulti were the great advocates of legal change
in Rome, that the chief initiative for remedial legislation
amending certain shortcomings of the Common Law came
from the English Inns of Court, or that the American Bar
Association has been the main driving force of legal reform in
See Radin, "The Good Judge of Chateau-Thierry and his American Counterpart" 10 Calif. L. Rev. 300 (1922). Justice James
E. Robinson of North Dakota was, according to Radin, in some
respects an American counterpart to Judge Magnaud.
8. See Gdny, "IM6thode d'interpretation et sources en droit priv6
positif" Vol. II, 287-307 (1932).

7.
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the United States. We know that the Roman jurists, with
few exceptions, were extremely conservative in their views,
and that they were much more prone to cite the opinion of
a jurist who had been dead for 200 years as controlling
their case than to make an eloquent argument for revision
or abandonment of a long-established rule. In England,
the Inns of Court, being the representative organs of the
legal profession, were much more concerned with preserving
and maintaining the tradition of the Common Law than
with initiating and sponsoring reform legislation. And it
is common knowledge that the American Bar has opposed
many attempts to introduce far-reaching legal innovations,
especially in the sphere of social legislation.
II.
What is the explanation for this conservative and tradition-bound attitude of the legal profession? It might perhaps be argued that the customary conservatism of the
legal profession finds its explanation in the fact that the
most prominent lawyers, the leaders and spokesmen of the
profession, have an emotional attachment to the existing
social and economic order which brought them fame and
monetary reward, and are therefore disinterested in basic
social and legal change which would upset the status quo.
But this argument does not furnish a full answer to the
problem we are investigating. The medical profession, too,
presents in its most successful representatives a body of
men who have achieved recognition and wealth under the
existing order of things and are generally not in favor of
any change. Politically and economically, the American
Medical Association is probably just as conservative as the
American Bar Association. But there exists a significant
difference. It cannot be said that the medical profession,
within the sphere of its own activity, is generally and
habitually inclined to oppose changes in medical methods,
the introduction of new therapeutic techniques found to be
effective, or the use of new drugs affording improved
methods of treatment. A physician is not likely to object
to the use of a therapeutic technique because 300 years ago
some wizard in the profession had rejected it. The legal
profession, on the other hand, is quite prone to maintain
the authority of a rule or principle proclaimed 300 years
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ago on the ground that it represents the old-established law.
Furthermore, radical advances and innovations in medicine
have usually originated within the ranks of the medical
profession and have not, as has happened so frequently in
the history of the law, been imposed from the outside and
in the face of resistance by the profession. The explanation for these differences is to be sought in the fact, to be
analyzed on the pages to follow, that, in the sphere of the
law, the "yesterday" is to a much greater extent an integral
part of the "today" than, for instance, in the domain of
medicine.
It is the thesis of this article that there are reasons
inherent in the nature and purpose of the law itself which
account for much of the traditional conservatism of the
legal profession and impart to it a certain element of inevitability. It would seem that there exist in human life, and
in society, forces which push us forward dynamically along
a certain road, as well as forces which hold us back and
restrain us from moving along too fast. The dynamic force
of motion, in nature as well as society, is countered by the
restrictive force of inertia. The law, it is believed, belongs
to the sphere of the restrictive forces in social life.
Let us start out with some considerations of a very
general nature. There is a force in the life of an individual
which drives him forward to spend himself and to exhaust
fully the possibilities of his existence. But there is also
a voice, of varying strength in different persons, which
exhorts him to go slowly and not to waste his strength
precipitately and prematurely. Restraint, the desire to keep
young and to conserve one's energies are frequently in a
struggle with the inclination to use one's powers and faculties to the fullest, to test one's capacities to the limit of the
possible, to "fulfill oneself."
The same is true of the life of nations. Dostoyevsky
once pointed out that nations were moved and swayed by
a force, the origin of which was unknown and inexplicable.
He described that force as "the force of an insatiable desire
to go on to the end, though at the same time it resists that
end." 9 If we try to paraphrase this thought, we might say
that every nation has an inexorable urge to test and use
its powers to the utmost and to fulfill its historical mission
9.

Dostoyevsky, "The Possessed" Part. II, ch. 1.

INDIANA LAW JOURNA,

[Vol.
23
[

and destiny, and an equally strong impulse to prolong its
life and national existence and avoid premature exhaustion
of its strength.
In this dialectic process, the law appears as one of the
strongest exponents of the restraining and conserving forces
active in the life of nations. The law represents "restraint"
not only in the sense that it imposes limitations upon the
exercise of power by private individuals as well as by the
government, 10 but also in a wider and more general sense.
Law is an institution which prevents nations and other
forms of human society from "going too fast"; it is a great
brake checking the free and unbridled play of the dynamic
forces in national and international life.
The dynamic and expansive forces in human society
may be conveniently designated by the term power. Power
is the great agent of change in social development. Its
most extreme manifestations are war and revolution, both
of which are antithetical to the idea of law. "The time of
arms is not the time of law," said Julius Caesar with great
insight into the nature of law. And a revolution is essentially a negation of law; it is a dynamic phenomenon in
which power is rampant, with few checks and restraints,
and which is characterized by a more or less complete
breakdown of law.
But the impact of power is not only visible in the great
readjustments of the law which are the result of social upheavals, revolutions, and wars. Power is also a causative
agent in effecting basic innovations of the law undertaken
by legislatures. In the making of law by legislatures, political forces, determined in their direction and strength by
constellations of power, are always operative together with
other factors, and the processes of law-making are in many
important respects basically different from the processes
governing the administration and application of the law.
In the process of legislation, we see the operation of
a phenomenon which may be called the transformation of
power into law. The dynamic pressures of individual or
group power find an adjustment in the law; and the more
permanent this adjustment is, the more successfully have
the functions of the law been achieved. The transformation
may be likened to the process by which, in nature, energy
10.

Cf. Bodenheimer, "Jurisprudence" 14 (1940).
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congeals into matter. Power may be compared to freeflowing, highly-charged energy, which is often destructive
in its effects. Law, on the other hand, has some of the attributes of matter: it is solid and acquires a degree of permanency and constancy which purely kinetic energy does
not have. Like matter, law is characterized by inertia; it
is resistant to change, while power, like energy, is a dynamic
force promoting change.
There have been nations which have been less successful than others in transforming the dynamic force of power
into the stabilizing and conserving force of the law. In
such nations, to use Dostoyevsky's words, the "desire to
go on to the end" has outweighed the urge "to resist that
end." Ancient Greece and (in a quite different way) Hitlerite Germany are examples of this type of nation. In both,
the impulses of power gained the upper hand over the instincts of restraint and conservation, although this was
much more marked in the case of the Third Reich than in
the case of Greece.
Ancient Greece had an illustrious history, but its span
of life as a leading power in the Mediterranean World was
short. After a brilliant display of genius, which manifested
itself in an unsurpassed outpouring of great works of art,
philosophy and literature in the fifth and fourth centuries
B.C., the Greek city states declined rapidly. And the Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great, which absorbed
them and conquered a large part of the ancient civilized
world, was of short duration and disintegrated immediately
after Alexander's death. The lack of political acumen which
characterized the Greeks was probably an important element in these developments. Chaotic and destructive political and social forces often remained uncontrolled and were
given a more or less free play. This led to an early exhaustion of the political organism in fratricidal struggles between,
as well as within, the various city states composing Greece;
and the Macedonian Empire, too, was held together more
by the dominating personality of Alexander than by impersonal cohesive forces which could have given it stability
and durability. It was not the gift of the Greeks to develop
and master the law as an instrument by which the disintegration of their political system could have been checked
or at least slowed. They did not even invent a term for
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"law" which would identify it as an independent agency
of social control. The word "nomos," which they used,
was a concept which embraced social conventions and moral
principles as well as the law.
Hitler's Germany (and perhaps Germany generally)
is another example of a nation unable to make a practical
use of the integrative power of the law. Hitler made an
effort of incredible violence to subjugate the world by force
and to make Germany the supreme master of all peoples.
The law was almost entirely abandoned as an instrument
of national as well as international policy in this endeavor
to "go on to the end" and fulfill the "Teutonic destiny,"
as Hitler conceived it. The fall of the nation, dissipation
of its power, disintegration of its national life were the
outcome of this attempt to lead Germany to glory and conquest through a super-dynamic, unbridled use of force.11
The history of Rome, on the other hand, presents the
spectacle of the rise of a nation which knew the secret of
utilizing the law as an effective tool in the building of an
Empire. The Roman national state and, later, the Roman
multi-national Empire developed and grew in a slow and
organic manner, without undue and premature exhaustion
by consuming and dynamic forces eating away the strength
of the nation. There occurred, it is true, social struggles
and political convulsions in Roman history which tested the
fiber of the nation to the utmost. But the stabilizing force
of the Roman Law prevented political disintegration and
anarchy, and gave to the whole development a certain cohesion, consistency, and gradualness. The forces of tradition and conservation formed an effective counterbalance
against the dynamic and expansive forces pushing Rome
toward the full consummation of her power in an Empire
which was able to preserve peace in the civilized world for
200 years; even the descent from the pinnacles of the Empire was marked by a remarkable gradualness and by many
2
moments of political recovery and legal reconstruction.
11. The supreme glorification of force in Hitler's Third Reich had
significant roots in earlier German philosophy. Even the legal
philosophy of Germany was strongly permeated with an antirational voluntarism, emphasizing the "arbitrary will", and with
state adoration. Cf. in this connection Dewey, "German Philosophy and Politics" 14 et seq. (1942); Northrop, "The Meeting
12.

of East and West" 214-215 (1946).
There are many indications in the history of the Anglo-American

world which show an equally keen recognition of the value of
law as an instrument of national and international life.
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In these examples, the law appears as an institution
tending to integrate certain valuable and constructive elements of the past into the fabric of the present, thereby
permitting a comparatively unbroken and continuous development of a nation. An intimate study of legal history will
also disclose the fact, related to the previous observation,
that the law is often an effective device for the neutralization of tensions. Frictions and conflicts of power within
as well as between nations can in many cases be resolved
or at least alleviated by the law through compromise and
adjustment. In this neutralizing process, the treatment of
individuals, groups, and nations on the basis of a certain
equality plays an important part in the realization of the
aims of the law. Just as tensions in the atomic world of
nature are neutralized when negative electricity combines
with positive electricity of equal charge, thus tensions and
frictions in human life tend to become relieved when grave
disparities of power are removed and the conflicting forces
are brought into a certain state of balance and equilibrium.
Where such an equilibrium has been achieved, the law
will strive with all its might to maintain and protect it
against disturbances and disruption. This is one of its essential functions. For the neutralization of tensions which the
law endeavors to realize would be largely illusory and of
little value if the adjustments accomplished by it are of an
entirely temporary and fleeting character. This brings us
to another element in the concept of law which is important for purposes of our argument-the element of durability.
Where the notion of duration in time is entirely absent,
one cannot talk of law.13 An individualized command made
for a single occasion (like the command of a policeman to
a driver to make a detour because the main highway is
temporarily blocked) is not, as such, a law. A system of
justice administered by a whimsical despot where each act
of his subjects is judged exclusively according to the momentary mood and temper of the ruler, without any reference to objective standards, is not a system of law. The
more ephemeral the character of an act or measure is, the
farther it is removed from the primary base of operation
of the law. A certain intent of self-perpetuation is inherent
in typical creations of a legal character; a law is designed
13.

Contra: Kelsen, "General Theory of Law and State" 38 (1945).
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to serve as a general rule of conduct governing an indeterminate number of situations likely to arise in the future.
The lawgiver means to build a lasting and durable structure; and the greatest monuments of the law are those
which have most successfully stood the test of time.
The Bible, in the Book of Daniel, tells us that in the
ancient Empire of Persia no law could ever be changed. "
If it is true that durability and premanency are essential
attributes of the idea of law, should we conclude that this
rule of the Persians embodies the last word of wisdom with
regard to the law and should have been adopted by other
nations?
The answer must, of course, be in the negative. But
not for the reasons advanced by certain adherents of the
"Realist School" of jurisprudence, who believe that the quest
for stability and certainty of the law is evidence of mental
immaturity and of infantile regressive tendencies on the
part of those advocating these values. 15 Stability, certainty,
and durability are desirable goals which have been pursued
wherever men have attempted to build effective systems of
law. The reason why these goals have been achieved with
only relative and partial success lies in the antinomic structure of nature, which confronts us with the phenomena of
change as well as constancy, motion as well as rest, instability as well as stability, and which ordains that life should
always feel the tug of these opposing tendencies. 6
Justice Cardozo wrestled deeply with the problem of
how the need for stability in the law can be reconciled with
the necessity for change. He believed to have found the
answer in the proposition that the spirit of conservation
and the spirit of change are both essential ingredients of
the idea of law. 1
But this thought can be accepted only
with certain reservations. The law, as we have seen, is
14.

Daniel 6:1.

15.

See Frank, "Law and the Modern Mind" 21, 244-245 (1935).

16.

See the remarks of Morris Cohen in his "Reason and Nature"
412 (1931).

One might add to his remarks:

even if it is true

that nothing in nature stands absolutely still, even if the seemingly

immovable and unyielding peaks of the mountains undergo trans-

fonmations in time, there is a vital difference between things
which change by infinitesimally small and imperceptible degrees,

and dynamic events in which the impact of change is clearly

visible, so that the antithesis of change and constancy is logical
and justified.
17. Cardozo, "The Paradoxes of Legal Science" 7 et seq. (1928).
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primarily a conserving force, it tends to resist motion and
change, and is to a highly perceptible degree governed by
the force of inertia; this furnishes a valid explanation for
the fact that the law often lags behind the times, as many
of its critics have noted. The great changes in the law come
from the outside, through the exercise of political power,
and the greater and the more incisive these changes are,
the greater is the role of power in their effectuation. There
is a constant interaction between power and law in the social
process, and the actual relations between these two forces
are as complex and unstable as the relations between energy
and matter. As energy may freeze into matter, and matter
may become converted into energy, 8 so power may be
transformed into law, and law may disintegrate into power
(as in the case of revolution and war). The kinetic forces
operating in human social and political life are so strong
that they constantly strive to tear into the protective armor
with which the law clothes existing institutions and spheres
of interest. Power is constantly tugging at the substance
of the law, and sometimes we are in doubt as to whether
we find ourselves in the area of the one or the other.
It would seem that a slight or gradual yielding to the

kinetic forces is by no means incompatible with the idea
of law. The means by which the judiciary endeavors to
keep the law abreast of the changing social conditions are
still within the legitimate province of the law. But if the
law gives up its claim to duration and self-perpetuation and
becomes a cluster of ad hoc measures, solely designed to
meet the exigency of the moment, it is on its way to selfabdication. When the rights and the legal status of individuals and groups in a social system become insecure, indeterminate, and subject to constant change at short intervals,
this is a sign that law has given way to arbitrary power.
Social conditions of excessive fluidity and chronic instability are hostile to the idea of law.
III.
To what extent have these considerations helped to
clarify our initial question? An attempt has been made to
show that the law, in its essential nature, is strongly tied
to the past; that it is a force holding back rather than
18.

Cf. Hecht, "Explaining the Atom" 110 (1947).
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pushing forward; that it operates as a brake upon the dynamic forces in human society which, if wholly unchecked
and unrestrained, may consume individuals, groups, and
nations by their relentless impact. If we view the law in
this light, if we see in it an attempt to arrest perpetual
and chaotic change and to surround certain human relations
and institutions with guaranties of permanence and duration, the commonly retrospective and conservative attitude
characteristic of the legal profession appears not only as
logical but as well-nigh inevitable. The members of the
Bench and Bar are not primarily pioneers and engineers of
the future. Their functions are those of conservators of
certain values of the past which have proved to be worthy
of preservation; and the most challenging part of this task
is perhaps that of weaving these values intelligently into
the texture of the present.
If this is true, we shall not blame the judiciary for
making a cautious, sparing, and reluctant use of the instrument of change. We shall understand and, within proper
bounds, find justification for the disinclination of the judges
to cast off, suddenly, long-established principles and doctrines, even where basic social changes make us skeptical
of their continued application.19 If the courts have yielded
to the forward-moving forces in social development only
slightly and gradually, and usually only in cases where a
change in social mores was so clear that the application of
an old rule to new conditions would have been entirely unreasonable, this has been due to reasons inherent in the
nature of the law itself.
We find that the functions of the judiciary in the revision and modernization of the law are confined to minor
alterations and "repairs," necessary to protect the structure,
19. A good example of this disinclination is furnished by the case

of Hynes v. New York Central R.R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229 (1921),
where a boy standing on the springboard on railroad property

was killed by the defendant's high tension wires falling from a
pole. In this case, the application of the old rule that the possessor of land is not liable for harm done to a trespasser caused
by his failure to put the land in a reasonably safe condition,
would have led to hardship and injustice. The court, in an

opinion written by Justice Cardozo, left the rule intact and put
the liability of the railroad on the ground that the boy would
have gone to his death even if he had not been on the board but
below it or beside it-a somewhat unconvincing type of reasoning
born of a desire to get around the ancient rule without actually
throwing it overboard.
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or parts of it, from disintegration and decay; they do not
normally go beyond this type of "maintenance work." For
great structural changes the judge must rely on outside
assistance. He cannot himself tear down the edifice of the
law or substantial parts of it, and replace them with new
ones. He is the superintendent of this edifice, charged
with the duty of keeping it in a good state of preservation,
rather than its architect.
The same is true of the lawyer. He, too, must work
with the tools which the past has handed to him, and his
chief task is not that of an innovator. The Bench and Bar
are not the proper proving ground for reformers and advocates of fundamental social change, whose activities must
be confined to the arena of political action where power
meets power, and where the dynamic forces of change are
beating against the protective harness with which the law
surrounds existing interests and institutions.

